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Abstract
This paper aims to shed light on the role of the ’ideology’ of politi-
cal parties in shaping the evolution of the welfare state in 18 developed
democracies, by providing empirical findings on the determinants of
social programs entitlements and social spending over the period 1981-
1999. The paper shows that structural change is a major determinant
of the extent of social protection. Our results suggest that overall
spending is driven up by structural change. On the other hand, strong
structural change has a negative influence on welfare entitlements mea-
sured by net replacement rates of sickness insurance or unemployment
benefits. Partisan influence plays an important role in the dynamics
of the welfare state. Left-wing governments strengthen the positive
∗We would like to thank Andrew Clark, Pierre Pestiau, Claudia Senik, Thierry Verdier
and other participants in the Journe´e Jourdan for their comments and suggestions. The
usual disclaimer applies.
†Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques, Unite´ Mixte de Recherche, CNRS - EHESS -
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effect of shocks on aggregate social expenditure while right-wing gov-
ernments undertake even stronger cutbacks in replacement rates as a
reaction to structural change.
Keywords: Welfare State, ideology, structural change
JEL classification: H5, I1, J8
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1 Introduction
This paper aims to shed light on the role of the ’ideology’ of political parties
in shaping the evolution of the welfare state in 18 developed democracies, by
providing empirical findings on the determinants of social programs entitle-
ments and social spending over the period 1981-1999.
A number of contributions in the field of economics study the impact of wel-
fare state institutions on economic performance (see Atkinson, 1999; Blan-
chard and Wolfers, 2000; Nicoletti et al., 2001; Nickell and Layard, 1999).
Following the process of European integration, economists have recently
shown a renewed interest toward the analysis of the changes taking place
in the architectures of the welfare state (see Andersen, 2003; Bertola et al.,
2001). Drawing on existing economic models (Andersen, 2002; Lizzeri and
Persico, 2001; Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno, 2002; Persson, Roland
and Tabellini, 2003; Persson and Tabellini, 1998), one can identify several
factors that may help explain the evolution of the welfare state: the features
of the pre-tax income distribution;1 income volatility;2 the social costs of tax-
ation and the income mobility of the median voter; and the characteristics
of political institutions. In this respect, Amable and Gatti (2005) present a
coalition model where social groups can trade - within the political arena -
income redistribution against income protection through labour market reg-
ulation; one insight of the model is that the relative political power of specific
social groups within political coalitions shape welfare state institutions and
their evolution following economic processes such as globalization: the de-
cline in workers’ political power is thus associated to a political equilibrium
yielding weaker income redistribution and/or employment protection.
A rich body of literature within the field of political economy stresses the role
1Following Romer (1975), increased inequality in pre-tax earnings is considered to yield
a larger political demand for redistributive policies. Recent contributions (Moene and
Wallerstein, 2001) suggest that the relation between inequality and redistribution is indeed
more complex and might even be non linear.
2Following the seminal work by Cameron (1978), income volatility is frequently related
to globalization (see Rodrik, 1998; Alesina andWacziarg, 1998). Iversen and Cusack (2000)
submit that growing insecurity is due to deindustrialization. Deindustrialization increases
insecurity because it exposes individuals to the risk of losing their job and having to ”cross
the borders” from traditional sectors (agriculture plus industry) to the service sector. The
authors produce estimates including internationalization variables, partisanship variables
and deindustrialization variables. They conclude that the coefficient of trade openness is
statistically insignificant once appropriate control variables are included in the regression.
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of political factors to explain recent and past changes in welfare state insti-
tutions (see, among others, Garrett and Mitchell, 2001; Huber and Stephens,
2001) as well as the variety of national configurations (Amable, 2003). Po-
litical partisanship, in conjunction with political institutions, is a key factor
that helps understanding the features of modern welfare states: the power
resources approach (Korpi and Palme, 2003) submits that the architecture
of the welfare state is the outcome of distributive conflicts between socioe-
conomic groups; because these conflicts are solved in the political arena,
partisan politics plays a crucial role in shaping their outcome.3
Recent developments in political economy have been marked by two major
debates, the first concerning the direction and importance of changes in na-
tional welfare states, the second related to the driving factors behind welfare
states’ evolution. Since the 1980s, growing external and internal constraints
(such as globalization, capital markets integration, and budget deficits) to-
gether with structural change (i.e. biased technological change and rising
inequalities, union decline, and demographic revolution) have radically mod-
ified the situation faced by political parties in developed democracies. These
forces, often deemed as irresistible, have contributed to create the basis for
what Pierson (2001) designates as the era of austerity. As a consequence of
austerity, the evolution of modern welfare states is held to have entered a
new phase and is supposed to have experienced a shift from expanding to de-
fending social entitlements. This alleged overwhelming trend is taken to be a
constraint for all governments, irrespective of their partisan positions. In this
respect, positions within the political economy arena differ greatly in relation
to the following two questions: 1) are countries experiencing massive welfare
state retrenchment or just reforms of mature welfare states in response to
challenges stemming from external and internal constraints? 2) does politi-
cal partisanship still play a role in the era of ’austerity’? Answers to those
questions oppose, on the one side, the ’partisans’ of the ”new politics” of
welfare states and, on the other side, the supporters of the ”amended” power
resources approach.
According to the ”new politics” approach (Pierson, 2001), the most salient
fact about recent welfare state changes is that they are surprisingly weak.
Hence, institutional inertia - despite growing external and internal pressures -
3One should note that, within the economic literature, the role of partisanship is widely
acknowledged in theoretical and empirical contributions focusing on the determinants of
fiscal policy over the business cycle (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995; Persson and Tabellini,
2000).
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seems to characterize the era of austerity. To explain institutional inertia two
main factors are put forward: first, welfare dismantling is a fairly unpopular
policy; second, the existence of formal and informal institutional veto points
prevents radical reforms (Bonoli, 2001). Pierson submits that the expansion
of the welfare state has itself contributed to the fading away of traditional
class divides, and given room to the emergence of ”powerful groups surround-
ing social programs” (Pierson, 1996, p. 2). In this case, one should expect to
find little evidence supporting the effects of partisan politics on welfare state
changes since 1970. The ’amended’ power resources approach raises the idea
that the contemporary era of austerity is better characterized as an epoch
where social citizenship rights in major insurance programs are in danger
(Korpi and Palme, 2003; Allan and Scruggs, 2004).4 Social citizenship rights
are entitlements allowing individuals to share their risks more equally within
the community. Crucial examples are pension and sickness programs but
equally important are programs insuring individuals who are more fragile
because, for instance, of their position in the labour market. The unemploy-
ment insurance scheme is one notable example. Empirical findings on the
evolution of social programs entitlements are indeed few. To our knowledge
only two contributions (Korpi and Palme, 2003; Allan and Scruggs, 2004)
address the issue. Their results, based on the study of net replacement rates
in sickness and unemployment insurance programs, seem to indicate that
partisan politics still plays a role as a driving force of modern welfare states
evolution. In particular, on the ground of their analysis of the British case,
Korpi and Palme (2003, p. 434) identify ”a radical change in an advanced
welfare state, a change carried through by a Conservative party within a con-
stitutional structure with few veto points and in the context of a markedly
weakened Labour Party and a largely defeated trade union movement”.
In spite of the growing body of literature, economists are still few to
present empirical contributions uncovering the determinants of welfare states
evolution. A few works have set the agenda for empirical investigations.
Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) present empirical evidence pointing to the role
of trade openness in determining the size of the welfare state. Alesina, Glaeser
and Sacerdote (2001) raise the issue of ethnic fragmentation and racial an-
imosity as crucial determinants of the small size of the US welfare state.
4These authors consider it necessary to abandon welfare state expenditure as measure
of generosity. This measure is in fact sensible to the business cycle: periods of high
unemployment and weak growth might in fact lead to a higher value of the welfare state
effort indicator, which are not due to accrued generosity but simply to economic crisis.
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Persson and Tabellini (1998) study the determinants of the size of govern-
ment and the provision of public goods and find support to the claim that
the size of government is smaller under presidential regimes. These results
are confirmed and extended by Persson (2002). Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and
Rostagno (2002) present evidence on the relationship between proportional
versus majoritarian systems and the size and composition of public spend-
ing. Moreover, the authors apply the methodology proposed by Blanchard
and Wolfers (2000) and run time series regression to study the government
response to shocks through fiscal spending, conditional to a set of political
institutional variables. Their results indicate that proportional systems tend
to show stronger fiscal reactions following economic shocks.
Building on a methodology close to the one proposed by Blanchard and
Wolfers (2000), our paper aims to provide an answer to the questions as
to whether and how governments’ political and ideological positions shape
welfare states’ reactions following exogenous economic shocks. Contrary to
existing empirical contributions focusing on the role of political institutions,
we investigate the joint effect of economic shocks and political partisanship
on the features of modern welfare states. Welfare state reactions are captured
through three different dependent variables: the first one is total social secu-
rity expenditure as a percentage of GDP (Armingeon et al., 2004); the second
and third ones are the net replacement rates of sickness and unemployment
insurance programs proposed by Allan and Scruggs (2004). Social security
expenditure is a standard indicator of an individual country’s generosity in
social protection and allows us to account for the effect of partisanship and
shocks on the size of the welfare effort. Net replacement rates are more struc-
tural measures of social entitlements and enable us to explore the influence
of partisanship and shocks on the institutional structure of the welfare state.
We model shocks by constructing two structural change variables on the ba-
sis of the OECD STAN industrial database, the first one reflecting changes
in industry value added shares, the second one based on changes in labour
force shares across industries.
To account for political partisanship, we make use of two continuous vari-
ables, one capturing the government’s ideological position in the left-right
spectrum, the other one measuring the ideological gap between government
and opposition as the distance between their respective positions in the left-
right spectrum.5 The rationale for the use of such a measure is that par-
5Both variables are built by using the PGL File Collection by Cusack and Engelhardt
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ties’ ideological positions have changed appreciably over the period under
scrutiny, a fact that may explain why the power resources and the ”new pol-
itics” approaches may both capture some of the substance of the evolutions
under way in welfare systems. Under the pressure of economic and social
changes, social groups may experience various processes of decomposition
and recomposition which will have consequences for the strategy of parties
seeking political support. In such circumstances, the assumption that par-
ties classified as ’conservative’ would systematically aim at dismantling the
welfare state while parties classified as progressive would defend the welfare
state may no longer be true.
In order to take into account the evolution of the position of political
parties, we do not, as most studies investigating the link between partisanship
and the welfare state do, take a dichotomous left/right classification but
build specific partisanship variables. The advantage is that, being defined
on a continuous scale, these variables allow us to account for changes, across
countries and over time, in the (strategical) positioning of political party in
the left-right spectrum. We are thus able to address properly the issue of
the redefinition of the left-right political distribution that may have taken
place since the 1980s. Our variables indicate nevertheless that the left-right
ideological rift persists in spite of ’austerity’. Hence, two interesting questions
follow: first, assessing to what extent such ideological rift is still relevant to
understand modern welfare state evolution; and second, exploring whether
the ‘shocks and partisanship’ combined effect acts differently on the size
versus the institutional structure of the welfare state.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some methodologi-
cal remarks, i.e. our method of estimation and the definition of our data set
and variables. Section 3 investigates the determinants of social expenditure
by focusing on the role of government ideology. Section 4 presents a similar
empirical analysis conducted on the determinants of sickness and unemploy-
ment net replacement rates. Section 5 provides some conclusive remarks and
prospects for future research.
(2002).
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2 Methodology
2.1 Estimation Method
One of the central questions in empirical political economy literature has
been that of the interaction between the economic and the political spheres,
i.e. the link between political and/or institutional variables on the one side
and (macro)economic variables on the other side.
Empirical research in this area has been shaped in a remarkable way by
an estimation method proposed by Blanchard and Wolfers [2000]. They used
a nonlinear specification to clarify the role of a number of exogenous shocks
(measured for example by TFP growth or the real interest rate) in interaction
with institutional components such as employment protection, replacement
rates and the role of unions in the evolution of unemployment in Europe.
Their estimation supposed multiplicative interactions between shocks and
institutions:
ui,t = ci +
(∑
k
Yk,i,t · ak
)
·
(
1 +
∑
j
Xi,j · bj
)
+ ei,t (1)
with ci being country fixed effects, Yi,t exogenous shocks, Xi,j institutional
variables. The idea is thus that countries will react differently to a given size
shock according to their specific institutional features.
The estimation technique has been frequently adopted in a more or less
modified form by a number of researchers in the domain of political eco-
nomics. Persson [2002] makes use of an estimation specification based on the
Blanchard-Wolfers method in order to shed light on the joint influence of eco-
nomic shocks and political institutions on policy outcomes. Milesi-Ferretti,
Perotti and Rostagno [2002] use the approach to estimate interaction effects
between unemployment and the countries’ electoral system with respect to
government spending. One may find applications in political economy too:
Iversen [2004] tries to explain the development of social spending while ac-
counting for the interaction of shocks and institutional settings.
In the present paper we shall make use of a very similar specification, but
for a different purpose. While these authors mainly let institutional variables
interact with economic shocks, we are interested in the link between struc-
tural changes in the economy and partisanship and their common influence
on the welfare state variables. The basic underlying question is thus the
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following: does the government’s political and ideological position have an
influence on the reaction of the social welfare system to exogenous structural
change?
The Blanchard-Wolfers equation is specified in levels and many subse-
quent papers have adopted such a specification too. Since we intend to use
annual data over a period of 20 years in our estimations,6 the problem of
data stationarity arises. We ran a series of panel unit-root tests on the main
variables of our data set, which led to the conclusion that most of these
variables could be integrated of order 1. Therefore, testing a model in level
would mean looking for cointegration relationships, interpreted as long-run
relationships regarding the evolution of the welfare state. On the other hand,
testing a model in difference means looking for a modeling of the ’short-run’
dynamics of the welfare state.7 For both statistical and theoretical reasons,
we chose the latter option. The investigation of a long-run relationship would
require some additional theoretical work in order to have a theory of the long-
run determinants of the welfare systems, as well as the relevant data. The
partisan and institutional influences on the size of welfare spending or the
generosity of the entitlements appear as explanations for the evolution of
already existing welfare systems and are thus more suited for the investiga-
tion of ’short-run’ dynamics. Therefore, the basic equation underlying our
estimations can be written as follows:
∆Yi,t = αi + β · Si,t · (1 + γ · Ii,t) (2)
+
∑
j
δj · Yi,t−j +
∑
k
ζkXk,i,t + η · trend+ i,t
with ∆Yi,t being the first difference of the dependent variable, αi country
fixed effects, Si,t the variable measuring structural change, Ii,t the variable
capturing partisanship,
∑
j Yi,t−j lagged levels of the dependent variable and∑
kXk,i,t a set of control variables. The trend may either be linear or a full
set of year dummies to account for unobserved year effects.
Some technical remarks are to be made on the estimation technique.
First, as the use of a nonlinear estimators requires a balanced panel (while
6Blanchard and Wolfers [2000] use 5-year averages.
7Some contributions (Iversen [2004] for instance) test a model in levels without the
appropriate testing procedures and are therefore plagued by the problem of ’spurious
regressions’. Most of the other contributions choose a model in difference.
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our panel is slightly unbalanced) we shall systematically linearize the spec-
ification. This is straightforward in the case of one shock and one political
variable, for no restrictions on the coefficients are required. A simple trans-
formation of our equation yields
∆Yi,t = αi + β · Si,t + β · γ · Si,t · Ii,t (3)
+
∑
j
δj · Yi,t−j +
∑
k
ζkXk,i,t + η · trend+ i,t
The estimated coefficient β · γ of the interaction term Si,t · Ii,t together
with the estimation of β can be used to compute γ, which gives an estimation
of how far the institution influences the reaction of the dependent variable
to a shock.
Second, and as a consequence, we will be enabled to use OLS with Beck
and Katz’ [1995] panel corrected standard errors,8 which, taking account
of the structure of our dataset, is supposed to give us reasonable standard
errors for the estimated parameters and to control the risk of overoptimistic
t-statistics.9 We shall also include in our regressions lagged levels of the
dependent variable to eliminate within-autocorrelation. We systematically
include fixed effects. We check for the stationarity of the residuals of our
estimations using Maddala and Wu’s test. Another problem is that of the
potential endogeneity of the political variable used in the regressions. In
these cases, we used an instrumental variables estimator10.
2.2 Variables
Our estimations are based on a pooled time series cross section data set,
comprising observations on 18 countries, covering the time period between
8Applying PCSE on an unbalanced dataset, we have to specify how missing observations
shall be treated when computing the covariance matrix of the disturbances: either using
only observations common to all panels, completely excluding time-periods with at least
one missing observation (CASEWISE option in STATA terminology) or using observations
common to the two panels used to calculate the covariance (PAIRWISE option). For
highly unbalanced panels with many missing observations, the PAIRWISE option may be
advisable. The chosen option is indicated with the results of our regressions. For more
details on the theory see Woolridge [2002], p.578 - 581.
9On the issue of the choice of PCSE for time series - cross section data rather than
panel data estimators (random effects model), see also Beck and Katz [2004].
10Instruments are lagged values of the interaction term between shock and ideology and
of a shock proxy.
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1981 and 1999. This dataset has been built on variables from a number
of different sources which are mentioned in the appendix along with the
description of the variables. Some of the indicators used in the following
have been merely imported from existing data sources, others have been
built on the basis of available statistics.
Regarding the variables used, the estimations made in this paper are
characterized by certain improvements with respect to the estimations found
in the literature. The modeling of structural change is based on an indica-
tor built using the OECD STAN industrial database, based on the changes
in the value added in different industries (VA shocks).11 For the construc-
tion of this variable we use a modification of the basic idea found in Lilien
(1982) and Abraham and Katz (1986): We suppose that high structural
fluctuations in both underlying values reflect exogenous economic shocks to
which the economy has to adapt. These shocks (respectively this structural
change) are likely to have consequences on the welfare systems, either raising
the demand for social insurance or inducing pressures to downsize the wel-
fare entitlements. Iversen and Cusack [2000] have ventured that most of the
risks generated in modern industrialized societies are the product of tech-
nologically induced transformations inside national labour markets. These
transformations take the form of structural change, shifts in the production
structure, which increase risks for individuals. When people lose their em-
ployment, they may lose the skills they have acquired when these are not
easily transferable to other firms, occupations or sectors. Structural change
may not only affect the structure of employment or production but also the
structure of worker representation. A decline in ’traditional sectors’ parallels
a decline in unionization and hence in the resistance capacity of organized
labour to welfare state retrenchment. Faced with an increase in risk exposure,
agents will express a demand for social protection and public risk-sharing.
Unemployment benefits, but also other aspects of social protection such as
sickness benefits, are ways to guarantee the status of workers by public means.
Taking into account a finer structural change than just the shift of employ-
ment from manufacturing to services as in Iversen and Cusack [2000] allows
to have a more precise assessment of the transformations likely to influence
the process described above. Our variable on structural change is positively
defined. However, it has a caveat: It may, in few rare cases, overshoot in
value. This is the reason why we proceed systematically in the elimination
11See the appendix for a more detailed description.
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of a couple of outlying values of this variable.
To account for partisanship, we propose a proxy for the government’s
ideological position (Government position). It specifies the government’s
position on a left-right scale and is based on the PGL File Collection by
Thomas R. Cusack and Lutz Engelhardt of the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin
fu¨r Sozialforschung. We have thus an indicator for partisanship on a yearly
basis which exhibits major advantages over traditional variables. Not only
can a party’s vote or cabinet share in country A have quite different im-
plications than the same vote or cabinet share in country B but also can
a party, which is qualified as ”left-wing” with respect to the parties on the
right end of the political spectrum, be in fact not so much on the left. The
same applies in reverse for conservative parties. Such an indicator has the
advantage over the more traditional binary variable (left/right) often found
in the literature of taking account of ideological changes even within a given
party or coalition.
The shock variable and the institutional parameter may enter the estima-
tion with their first-lag-value to take into account the potential delay with
which economic variables eventually react to shocks and to political decisions.
Our choice of control variables is in line with the existing literature and
reflects standard assumptions about structural welfare state determinants.
To capture the effect of the size of groups that are likely to benefit from
or depend on social protection, we may include OECD unemployment rates
(unemployment) and the share of the population over 65 years of age (Elderly
People) taken from Armingeon et al. [2004]. To take into account what is
known as ”Wagner’s law”, i.e. the positive link between GDP and public
expenditure, we use the growth of GDP (GDP growth) in percent as a con-
trol, taken from the same source. In times of budgetary restrictions (whether
self-imposed or as a consequence of stability pacts) the government’s budget
balance may play a role in explaining welfare state austerity, so we include al-
ternatively the budget balance (budget balance/GDP) variable given by Allan
and Scruggs (2004), the OECD ratio of public debt over GDB (debt/GDP) as
well as the OECD cyclically adjusted government balance over GDP (cycl.
adjusted balance/GDP), the latter being a good proxy for the structural
deficit or surplus. Finally, we may include a variable comprising the sum
of exports and imports as a percentage of real GDP (openness) to account
for the role of economic openness. This measure has been taken from the
Huber et al. [2004] dataset and is a widespread measure of the influence of
globalization.
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We test three different dependent variables: First, overall social security
spending as a percentage of GDP taken from Armingeon et al. (2004), which
is the standard indicator for a country’s effort in social protection. It will
allow us to draw conclusions on the volume-effect of government partisanship
and exogenous shocks. Second and third, Allan’s and Scruggs’ (2004) net
replacement rates of sickness and unemployment insurance. These variables
will give us an indication of existing structure-effects. Furthermore, the latter
two dependent variables have major advantages: First, they are fairly new
and thus not very much explored, and second, they much better reflect the
structural development of social protection than the gross replacement rates
that have been in use in most of the literature.
3 Assessing welfare state retrenchment, struc-
tural change and partisan influence
3.1 Analyzing global social expenditure
As our study tries to identify the main factors that influence welfare state
developments, we first have a look on overall welfare spending even if esti-
mations based on social spending alone are not likely to tell us the whole
story of recent welfare state development. Nevertheless, they give us a first
idea on the global role of shocks or structural change on social protection,
and on the strength of partisan influence in the transmission of these shocks.
More precisely, we want to explore whether the partisan position influences
governments’ effort to cushion exogenous structural change by augmenting
social security expenditure.
As mentioned above, the dependent variable (total social expenditure)
enters our equation in the form of its first difference (∆y = yt− yt−1). Fixed
effects are systematically included.
The OLS regression shows a positive and significant impact of the value
added shock on welfare expenditure (table 1): The higher the variable VA
shock, i.e. the stronger the structural change, the higher the rise in social
expenditure. This result can at first view be understood as a support for
the Rodrick [1998] argument that higher economic insecurity and increasing
volatility lead to a welfare state expansion. Furthermore, the left-right ideo-
logical position of the respective governments has a significant influence on
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the propagation of the shock into the sphere of social protection: The more
the incumbent government is positioned at the right end of the political spec-
trum (the higher our indicator is), the lower is the expansionary effect of the
shock. Additionally to the coefficients of VA shock and the interaction term
we calculate the marginal effects of the shock and the marginal effect of the
shock together with a shift to the left in ideology by one standard deviation
in terms of our partisan variable. The first gives the marginal change in total
social expenditure with respect to the shock when the partisan variable is
evaluated at its mean value. The second gives an idea of what the effect of
the shock is at the margin when the government is more left-wing by one
standard deviation than the mean government. The results underline the
findings described above: The marginal effect of the shock is positive, driv-
ing global welfare expenditures up. With a more left-wing government, the
welfare expansion as a reaction to the shock more than doubles in size.12 We
also ran the same estimation with unemployment rates as an additional con-
trol. Results concerning the effect of structural change, partisanship and the
budget deficit did not change much: neither the estimated coefficients, nor
the associated significance level. The coefficient of unemployment, however,
was weakly negative but largely insignificant.
We already pointed to the extreme variance of the employed shock proxy
and its tendency to overshoot. In order to avoid problems with extreme out-
liers, we eliminate from our panel a couple of observations for which the VA
shock takes extraordinarily large values13, with the result that the significance
of the interaction term rises considerably, letting signs and tendencies basi-
cally unchanged. In the course of the paper we shall systematically undertake
this elimination strategy for all following estimations with this variable.
When we replace the linear time trend by unobserved year effects (Table
2), results are fairly similar to those presented above. Only the effect of
strong structural change as well as the combined effect of shock and parti-
sanship rise significantly in levels: both marginal effects more than double
in size. Nevertheless, the relative importance of the influence of partisanship
with respect to the the consequences of structural change stays merely the
same: The marginal shock-effect together with a government which is more
left-wing by one standard deviation has twice the size of the marginal effect
12On the interpretation of multiplicative effects see the debate in Braumoeller (2004)
and Friedrich (1982).
13In fact we reduce the panel to observations for which the variable VA shock takes
values under 10.
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Yearly Change in Social Expenditure
VA shock 0.0489**
(2.13)
VA shock*gov-position -0.0023*
(-1.68)
Elderly People 0.1737***
(3.20)
Budget Balance -0.1220***
(-3.99)
Linear Trend 0.0489*
((1.83))
Social Expenditure (t-1) 0.0717
(0.70)
Social Expenditure (t-2) -0.3628***
(-3.71)
Estimator PCSE (pairwise)
Eliminated extreme shocks? no
Number of observations 284
Baltagi autocorr.-test 0.483
Maddala Wu 224.325***
R2 0.38
marginal shock-effect 0.0413*
marginal shock-effect with government 0.0831***
more left wing by one standard-deviation
Table 1: Effects of structural change and partisanship on social expenditure
(PCSE estimation). No outliers eliminated. t-statistics in brackets, signifi-
cant coefficients (significance-level ≤ 10%) printed in bold.
of structural change alone. This means that having a government which is
located to the left (resp. right) of the average governments of our sample by
one standard deviation of our partisan variable means that the impact of the
shock is increased (resp. lessened) by about 100%.
The partisan influence can be confirmed by estimations using an alter-
native shock variable which is constructed accordingly using inter-industry
shares of labour fluctuations (evenly taken from the OECD STAN-database)
instead of value added shares. We don’t report detailed results here, but the
signs of the coefficients of interaction terms once again indicate that shocks
lead to a reduction of welfare spending when the government coalition is
located on the right end of the political spectrum; the more right wing the
government coalition, the stronger the welfare reducing effect of shocks.
It seems plausible to summarize, that these results constitute strong ar-
guments in favor of the idea that ideologies keep playing a significant role in
welfare state dynamics.
Table 2 shows that estimated results are stable, even if the government
budget balance is replaced by its cyclically adjusted counterpart which ac-
counts more for the purely structural effects of budget deficits or surpluses.
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Yearly Change in Social Expenditure Yearly Change in Social Expenditure
VA shock 0.1337*** 0.1291***
(3.13) (3.15)
VA shock*gov-position -0.0048** -0.0043*
(2.12) (1.89)
Budget balance -0.0691***
(3.08)
Cycl. adj. gov. balance -0.0666***
(3.36)
Growth of GDP -0.1275*** -0.1501***
(4.54) (5.06)
Openness -0.0259*** -0.0200**
(3.16) (2.25)
Social Expenditure (t-1) -0.0273 -0.0130
(0.36) (0.18)
Social Expenditure (t-2) -0.1760** -0.1727**
(2.25) (2.30)
Estimator PCSE PCSE
Number of observations 247 247
R2 0.64 0.64
Baltagi autocorr.-test 0.1677 0.0216
Maddala & Wu 59.154*** 59.367***
Marginal shock effect 0.1152*** 0.1128***
Marginal shock-effect with government 0.2052*** 0.1919***
more left wing by one standard-deviation
Table 2: Effects of structural change and partisanship on social expenditure
(PCSE estimation)
In both cases, the effect has about the same magnitude and the same sig-
nificance level. Whichever control variable is used, it is worth mentioning
that the lower the budget deficit (respectively the higher the surplus), the
lower are the global social expenditure. At first sight, this would mean that
in the period under consideration, a higher financial margin in times of small
budget deficits or even surpluses has not systematically been used for higher
welfare expenditures. There is - at least in part - a mechanical explana-
tion for this observation: Budget surpluses frequently coincide with times of
economic prosperity and low unemployment, so that the number of people
claiming welfare benefits is lower.
The partisan influence can be confirmed by estimations using an alternative
shock variable which is constructed accordingly using inter-industry shares
of labour fluctuations instead of value added shares. We don’t explicitely re-
port these results, but the signs of the coefficients of interaction terms once
again indicate that shocks lead to a reduction of welfare spending when the
government coalition is located on the right end of the political spectrum.
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3.2 Analyzing sickness and unemployment benefits
The limits of comprehensive spending variables have already been mentioned:
they may be driven by influencing factors that we cannot control for in a rea-
sonably tractable way. Besides, it has been shown that overall social expendi-
ture includes components that react in a fairly mechanical way to structural
change and shocks, which may lead to higher unemployment, leading to a
rise in the number of beneficiaries, boosting transfer payments and therefore
overall spending, without any political intervention.14 Last but not least,
austerity and retrenchment are keywords of much of the debate on social
protection in recent years (see for example Korpi [2003]), but announced
cutbacks on overall spending levels may be politically dangerous. Structural
cuts in benefits are thus likely to be ”hidden” in subcategories of welfare
expenditure.
As already mentioned above, we shall make use of two entitlement vari-
ables that have only recently been constructed by Allan and Scruggs (2004) :
net-replacement-rates of unemployment and sickness insurance, i.e. the per-
centage of foregone earnings replaced by those insurances, net of taxes and
other charges. They are far more precise than the gross replacement rates
proposed by the OECD. Besides the fact that these data are fairly new and
relatively unexplored, they have the advantage of not indicating spending
volumes but being highly comparable structural measures of two important
welfare state components. These variables enter our equations (analogous to
what has been done in the preceding section) in the form of their one year
difference (∆y = yt − yt−1).15
The story on the link between structural change and replacement rates
would have to be told like this: Strong structural change as we measure it can
be seen as the expression of an adaptative process the economy undergoes
to handle globalization, deindustrialization and exogenous shocks. These
phenomena may reduce governments’ tax earnings, raise the number of those
who claim welfare state entitlements and so put pressure on government
budgets. Governments desirous to maintain budget discipline would not only
cut back overall welfare spending, but also make structural reforms in the
design of social programs - such as systematic reductions of replacement rates.
14See Pierson [1996], Korpi and Palme [2003], and for the ”dependent variable problem”
Green-Peddersen [2004].
15The very few missing values in the original replacement rate series have been filled in
by linear interpolation.
17
Sickness Insurance Replacement Rate Sickness Insurance Replacement Rate
(yearly changes) (yearly changes)
VA shock (t-1) -0.3000*** -0.2382*
(3.35) (1.75)
(VA Shock * Gov. Position)(t-1) -0.0457*** -0.0536***
(2.05) (3.41)
Elderly People 0.6160** 0.3942
(2.44) (1.30)
Budget balance -0.0915
(1.41)
Debt/GDP 0.0380*
(1.63)
Growth of GDP 0.1082 0.1148
(1.26) (1.26)
Unemployment -0.1677* -0.2064*
(1.86) (1.91)
Linear Trend -0.2509*** -0.2832***
(5.08) (5.30)
RR Sickness Insurance (t-1) -0.2876*** -0.2698***
(4.33) (3.78)
RR Sickness Insurance (t-2) -0.1552*** -0.1841***
(3.30) (3.73)
Estimator IV IV
Number of observations 241 224
R2 0.38 0.37
Sargan 2.633 3.847
Wu-Hausman 9.745*** 10.150***
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 10.404*** 10.870***
Maddala & Wu 47.731** 84.544***
marginal effect of shocks -0.3860*** -0.3134**
Marginal shock-effect with government 0.4390* 0.6687**
more left wing by one standard-deviation
Table 3: Effects of structural change and partisanship on sickness replace-
ment rates (IV estimation)
Were these forces irresistible and were welfare state retrenchment without
alternative, governments’ reactions would be independent of partisanship:
Left wing and right wing politics would both be characterized by massive
welfare state cutbacks as a consequence of structural change.
The specification of our estimations are roughly the same as in the previ-
ous section. Here, structural change forces the year to year change of replace-
ment rates of sickness insurances down in a statistically significant manner
(table 3). However, there appears to be a time lag in the influence of shocks
on replacement rates, which comes without surprise and can be explained on
theoretical grounds: While overall welfare spending may react (at least in
part) mechanically and immediately to structural change (e.g. through the
channel of a higher number of claimants and thus higher benefit payments),
replacement rates are to a large degree the result of a political decision pro-
cess, which usually takes time. We used first lags of the shock proxies and
the corresponding interaction term to account for this phenomenon.
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Sickness Insurance Replacement Rate
(yearly changes)
VA shock (t-1) -0.2897**
(2.24)
(VA shock * Gov. Position)(t-1) -0.0471***
(3.42)
Elderly People 0.5918**
(2.33)
Cycl. adj. budget balance -0.0523
(0.79)
Unemployment -0.1117
(1.42)
Linear Trend -0.2501***
(5.00)
RR Sickness Insurance (t-1) -0.2838***
(4.24)
RR Sickness Insurance (t-2) -0.1570***
(3.31)
Estimator IV
Fixed Effects yes
Number of observations 241
R2 0.37
Maddala & Wu 46.305**
Sargan 2.368
Wu-Hausman 10.638
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 11.312
Marginal shock-effect -0.3783***
Marginal shock-effect with government 0.4721*
more left wing by one standard-deviation
Table 4: Effects of structural change and partisanship on sickness replace-
ment rates (IV estimation) without taking GDP growth into account
The coefficient for the interaction term is significantly negative (tables
3 and 4). Structural change and an ideologically right-oriented government
(which translates into high positive values of the interaction term) are as-
sociated with a relatively lower replacement rate than weak shocks or left-
oriented governments. Knowing that the structural change variable has itself
a significantly negative influence on the replacement rate, we can conclude
that the more the government is ideologically on the right end of the political
spectrum, the stronger the reduction of the replacement rate as a consequence
of the shock will be. On the other hand, the presence of a left-wing govern-
ment would imply that the negative effect of the shock is weakened. The
marginal effects for both the structural change and the partisan effects strik-
ingly underline this interpretation: At the margin, the effect of the shock
with the partisan variable evaluated at its mean is negative, i.e. the shock
itself drives down replacement rates. The marginal effect of this structural
change with a government which is more left-wing by one standard devia-
tion even turns positive. In our sample, left-wing governments reacted to
shocks not with cutbacks of replacement rates, but with a rise in welfare
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state generosity in order to cushion the effects of structural changes. Com-
paring marginal effects in tables 3 and 4 one notes that the influence of the
government being (by one standard deviation) more leftwing than the mean
on the marginal shock effect has two to three times the size of the marginal
effect of the shock alone.
Using replacement rates of unemployment insurance, we applied basically
the same estimation techniques, and results are similar to what has been
found for sickness insurance replacement rates: Both coefficients (shock and
interaction term) are negative, giving in principle rise to the same interpreta-
tion as for the sickness insurance replacement rate: Right-wing governments
together with strong shocks lead to lower replacement rates; left-wing govern-
ments or weak structural shocks lead to higher replacement rates. Changes
in the control variables do not fundamentally alter our main results and leave
the significance of the interaction term estimation basically unchanged. As
in previous sections, the partisan position plays a strong role in explaining
the change of welfare entitlements in reaction to structural change induced
by labour fluctuations.
4 What can be learned from the controls?
The emphasis of the econometric section of this paper clearly lies on the
determination of the joint influence of structural change and political parti-
sanship on the welfare state. However, a complete set of standard controls
has been included in order to account for effects of which theory tells us
that they are probably playing a decisive role in welfare state development:
the unemployment rate, the share of elderly people in the population, GDP
growth, public debt, government budget balance (or its cyclically adjusted
counterpart), economic openness or government’s ideology. As much can be
learned on welfare state retrenchment from these estimations, we summarize
the main findings in this section.
Before turning to the interpretation of controls that have actually been in-
cluded, a comment should be made on a variable that has systematically not
been excluded from our estimations: Following a stringent application of the
Blanchard/Wolfers approach we estimated the joint influence of shocks and
partisanship on welfare state variables. The purpose of this paper was not
to estimate the influence of partisanship on its own. The latter approach has
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already been at the center of a large part of the literature on welfare state
retrenchment and results are generally in line with our findings. Further-
more, simply adding the partisanship variable to the list of controls would
have exposed us to a serious problem of multicollinearity between the shock
proxy, the partisan variable and the interaction term.
Economic openness is an explanatory factor of welfare state downsizing
(tables 3 and 4). It seems as if economies relying heavily on foreign trade
were in fact more vulnerable to exogenous shocks, which may force social
expenditure down. Similarly, budgetary restrictions also seem to have their
part in the explanation of welfare state development. As detailled above, the
budget balance is negatively correlated with global welfare spending. The
reason can be seen in the fact that times of low budget deficits (or even sur-
pluses) usually coincide with a prosper economic situation, where the number
of people claiming welfare state entitlements falls considerably. The effect
on overall welfare expenditure is about the same for the government bud-
get balance (in percent of GDP) as for its more structural counterpart: the
cyclically adjusted government balance (in percent of GDP). The influence
of these parameters on the replacement rates, however, cannot be confirmed:
Tables 3 and 4 show that coefficients are marginal and highly insignificant.
These findings underline that replacement rates are indeed measures for wel-
fare state development that react much less mechanically to changes in the
economic environment than global entitlement measures.
We do not find clear evidence for an effect of economic growth on replace-
ment rates: Tables 3 shows that its influence is positive, but insignificant.
On the contrary, high GDP growth rates drive global social spending down
in a highly significant way (table 2). Contrary to a first intuition one should
conclude from this finding, that favorable economic development does not
automatically lead to higher welfare spending. Turning to the influence of
public debt on replacement rates (table 3), findings are evenly surprising
with a higher debt rate leading to higher replacement rates. Further re-
search should explore these phenomena more in detail.
The size of groups of potential claimants are important factors of welfare
state evolution: The share of elderly people in the population is significantly
and positively linked either to global spending as well as to the replacement
rates. Two explanations should be considered: Elderly people are usually
claimants of welfare state entitlement in more than one branch of social se-
curity (retirement, health care). First, with a rising share of elderly people
in the population welfare spending mechanically goes up (tables 1 and 2).
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Second, as the elderly rely more heavily on social insurance income, they
are more likely to vote for politics favoring welfare state expansion, which
may explain the positive effect on the more structural variable (tables 3 and
4). Unemployment has a significantly negative effect on replacement rates
without altering the influence of partisanship. The consequence of a high
number of unemployed are high social expenses and strong budgetary pres-
sures, which translate into the necessity of structural spending cuts. Together
with the comparatively weak political power of the unemployed (who do not
seem to have homogenous political preferences), this explains the negative
effect of unemployment on replacement rates.
5 Conclusions and outlook
The main task of this paper was to provide an answer to the question whether
partisan politics and the ideology of governments still play a role in welfare
state evolution. Do left and right governments find different answers in terms
of social policy to exogenous shocks ? In the present paper, these shocks were
proxied by structural change in the industry shares of the value added. The
interaction with a newly designed partisan variable was tested. The main
results can be summarized as follows.
Structural change is itself a major determinant of the extent of social
protection. Our results suggest that overall spending is driven up by struc-
tural change, which may to a large degree be the result of a mechanical rise
of transfers when shocks lead to economic frictions and unemployment. On
the other hand, strong structural change has a negative influence on wel-
fare entitlements measured by net replacement rates of sickness insurance or
unemployment benefits.
Partisan influence plays an important role in the dynamics of the wel-
fare state. It does so in the direction that one would expect not only from
political intuition, but also from former empirical work. Left-wing govern-
ments strengthen the positive effect of shocks on aggregate social expenditure
while right-wing governments undertake even stronger cutbacks in replace-
ment rates as a reaction to structural change.
Our paper supports previous findings underlining the role of structural
change on the welfare state, but also underlines the importance of ideologies.
It is well documented that partisan politics played a role in the emergence of
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welfare states. It also plays a role in the current evolution of welfare systems,
even in times of ’austerity’ and retrenchment.
A couple of questions will have to be left for further research. While the
present paper exhibited the importance of incumbents’ ideology for its po-
litical reaction to shocks, the interaction between government partisanship
and the ideology of the opposition should be carefully explored as one would
like to have information on their mutual influence in recent welfare state
development. Furthermore, in this paper we had to leave aside the relation
between partisanship and diverse institutional characteristics, such as frac-
tionalization of the political scene, vote mechanisms or the influence of social
groups.
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Appendix
The construction of VA shock and labour shock:
The basis of their construction is constituted by two time series cross sec-
tion datasets from the 2004 STAN Indicators database: Value added shares
relative to the total economy (VA) and employment shares in the total econ-
omy (LAB). Let i be the industy16, c the country, t a time index, we compute
the following indicator
16For each series, the following industies and sub-industries are taken into account: 1.
AGRICULTURE, HUNTING, FORESTRY AND FISHING, 2. MINING AND QUAR-
RYING, 3. Food products, beverages and tobacco, 4. Textiles, textile products, leather
and footwear, 5. Wood and products of wood and cork, 6. Pulp, paper, paper products,
printing and publishing, 7. Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel, 8. Chem-
icals excluding Pharmaceuticals, 9. Pharmaceuticals, 10. Rubber and plastics products,
11. Other non-metallic mineral products, 12. Iron and steel, 13. Non-ferrous metals, 14.
Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment, 15. Machinery and equip-
ment, n.e.c., 16. Office, accounting and computing machinery, 17. Electrical machinery
and apparatus, nec, 18. Radio, television and communication equipment, 19. Medical,
precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks, 20. Motor vehicles, trailers and
semi-trailers, 21. Building and repairing of ships and boats, 22. Aircraft and space-
craft, 23. Railroad equipment and transport equipment n.e.c., 24. Manufacturing nec,
25. ELECTRICITY, GAS AND WATER SUPPLY, 26. CONSTRUCTION, 27. Whole-
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INDV Ac,t =
∑
i
(V Ac,i,t − V Ac,i,t−1)2 (4)
and in an similar way:
INDLABc,t =
∑
i
(LABc,i,t − LABc,i,t−1)2 (5)
with INDLABc,t (IND
V A
c,t ) being the structural change variable based on em-
ployment shares (value added shares) for year t in country c. Taking squared
differences has two major implications: First, the indices are positively de-
fined, and second, they exhibit much variance and some values may ”over-
shoot” for strong structural changes, leading to a risk of overinterpretation
of shocks.
These two synthetic proxies for structural change show only low correla-
tion: The correlation coefficient is 0.1105 for both series. Taking lags into
account does lead to significant differences. However, elimininating the most
extreme values from the series drives the correlation coefficient up to 0.3007.
Nevertheless we state that the two variables are proxies for two different sorts
of shocks - one may be seen as taking place in product markets, the other in
the labour market.
The construction of the Government Position Variable
We have constructed Government Position on the basis of a 2002 version
of the PGL File Collection by Thomas R. Cusack and Lutz Engelhardt of
the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fu¨r Sozialforschung. Their dataset provides
variables for numerous political parties reflecting the relative frequency of
statements in party manifestos on characteristic economic and non-economic
political topics such as Keynesian demand management, peace or decentral-
ization. From this voluminous list of variables, we have chosen a subset in
sale and retail trade; repairs, 28. Hotels and restaurants, 29. Transport and storage, 30.
Post and telecommunications, 31. Financial intermediation, 32. Real estate activities, 33.
Renting of machinery and equipment and other business activities, 34. Public admin. and
defence; compulsory social security, 35. Education, 36. Health and social work, 37. Other
community, social and personal services, 38. Private households with employed persons.
Ignoring truncation errors and missing categories, value added and labor shares of these
subgroups add up to 100%.
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order to construct a useful indicator. In that sense, our indicator for a left-
right positioning of a party includes the relative frequencies of statements
on: Governmental and Administrative Efficiency, political authority, free en-
terprise, incentives, economic orthodoxy, welfare state limitation, traditional
morality (positive statements), law and order, labour groups (negative state-
ments), military (positive statements). Those frequencies are summed up and
have a positive influence on the indicator, rising up its value. We substract
(lowering the indicator’s value) relative frequencies of statements on: market
regulation, economic planning, Keynesian demand management, controlled
economy, nationalization, Marxist analysis, social justice, welfare state ex-
pansion, traditional morality (negative statements), social harmony, positive
statements on labour groups, underprivileged minority groups, military (neg-
ative statements). The resulting indicator gives us a positioning of parties
on a positive-negative scale, higher values standing for more right-leaning
parties. However, its absolute value is difficult to interpret precisely, but it
it very useful for intertemporal and inter-country comparisons. For a multi-
party government (which is a frequent political constellation), the indicator
is the vote-weighted mean of the indicators’ of all governing parties.
Let i be the country in question, let r = 1...n be the governing par-
ties in parliament, let sr be the respective last election share of votes, let
CrL, L = 1...m be the values of left characteristic variables for party r and
CrR, R = 1...k be the values of right characteristic variables for party r, then
Government position (GP) can be written as:
GovernmentPosition =
1
n
∑
r
[
(
∑
R
CrR −
∑
L
CrL)sr
]
List of control variables
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Name of Variable Explication Source
Elderly People Share of the population of
65 years of age and older
Armingeon et al. [2004],
missing values linearly in-
terpolated
Budget Balance General Government Bal-
ance (in percent of GDP)
Allan and Scruggs [2004]
Growth of GDP Growth of GDP, change in
percent from previous year
Armingeon et al. [2004]
Openness Sum of Exports and Im-
ports as a percentage of
current GDP
Huber et al. [2004]
Unemployment Unemployment Rates,
standardized as far as
possible, according to
OECD criteria
Armingeon et al. [2004]
Debt/GDP Public Debt as a percent-
age of GDP
OECD
Cycl. adj. budget balance cyclically adjusted budget
balance as a percent of
GDP
OECD
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